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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to present and evaluate the main changes to the appeal proceedings 
model introduced in the last few years to the Polish criminal proceedings in order to accelerate it 
and, thereby, satisfy the requirements of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The article presents arguments supporting the thesis 
whereby these have weakened the right of the defendant to appeal against the judgement. Under the 
currently applicable regulations, it is permissible that an appellate court may impose a penalty for the 
first time which cannot be subject to an effective appellate review. Such a solution may raise doubts 
as to its compliance with Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The article also formulates a thesis whereby the newly introduced measure – a complaint against the 
cassatory judgement of the appellate court – contrary to preliminary fears, has not in fact “blown 
up” the system of appeal measures in the Polish criminal proceedings. At the same time, despite the 
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relatively small scope of its use, it may contribute to strengthening the appeal – as opposed to the 
revisory – model of appellate proceedings and thus accelerating the criminal proceedings. This thesis 
is based on the research of all complaints brought to the Supreme Court in 2016–2019.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to present and evaluate the main changes to the 
appeal proceedings model introduced in the last few years to the Polish criminal 
proceedings in order to accelerate it and, thereby, satisfy the requirements of Ar-
ticle 6 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 4 November 1950.1 New mechanisms for 
restricting the possibility of issuing cassatory judgements by appellate courts are 
presented, as well as the new measure of appeal – the complaint, introduced in order 
to secure reformatory adjudication in the appeal instance. An attempt to answer 
the following questions was made: may the new model of appeal proceedings ac-
tually contribute to accelerating criminal proceedings and have the model changes 
lowered the procedural guarantees of defendants, in particular their right to appeal 
against the judgement with reference to both guilt and imposition of a penalty. 
Furthermore, the assessment of the legitimacy of introducing a new measure of 
appeal – the complaint into criminal proceedings and the prospects of its impact 
on accelerating criminal proceedings – were made.
The article presents arguments supporting the thesis whereby the most recent 
changes in the model of appeal proceedings have weakened the right of the defend-
ant to appeal against the judgement. Under the currently applicable regulations, it 
is permissible that an appellate court may impose a penalty for the first time which 
cannot be subject to an effective appellate review. Such a solution may raise doubts as 
to its compliance with the international obligations which are binding for Poland and 
stem from Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2
The article also formulates a thesis whereby the newly introduced measure – 
a complaint against the cassatory judgement of the appellate court – unknown to 
European legal systems, contrary to preliminary fears, has not in fact “blown up” 
the system of appeal measures in the Polish criminal proceedings. At the same 
time, despite the relatively small scope of its use, it may contribute to strengthen-
1 Journal of Laws 1933, no. 61, item 284, as amended, hereinafter: ECHR.
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by United Nations General 
Assembly on 16 December 1966 (Journal of Laws 1977, no. 38, item 167), hereinafter: ICCPR.
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ing the appeal – as opposed to the revisory – model of appellate proceedings and 
thus accelerating the criminal proceedings. These conclusions are drawn from the 
analysis of all complaints brought to the Supreme Court in 2016–2019.
THE “CASSATORY-REVISORY” MODEL OF APPEAL PROCEEDINGS AS 
A SOURCE OF EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The proceedings reviewing the judgement of a first instance court may be of 
appeal, cassatory or revisory character. In the appeal model, the appellate court is 
entitled to conduct a substantive review of the judgement within the scope of the 
appeal measure. It is entitled to conduct evidence and make factual findings on its 
own, as well as to issue a judgement as to the merit different from the one given 
by the first instance court. In turn, in the cassatory model, the appellate review is 
limited to legal issues, therefore, the appellate court is not, in principle, authorised 
to conduct evidentiary proceedings. After the examination of such an appeal, it 
may either dismiss it or – by granting it – quash the judgement and refer the case 
for re-examination to the first instance court. The revisory model envisages the 
review of the judgement in terms of both legal and factual issues. In this model, 
it is permissible not only to issue a cassatory judgement, but also a judgement 
changing the verdict of the first instance court, however, only on the basis of the 
factual circumstances determined in the first instance judgement.3
Until 30 June 2015, an appeal proceedings model, highly similar in its nature to 
the cassation and revisory model, was in force in Poland.4 In the course of the con-
stitutionally guaranteed two-instance proceedings, the function of appellate courts 
was implemented mainly through reviewing adjudication and not in its possible 
modification. The possibility of modifying the judgement of the first instance court 
was significantly limited on several levels, with two of them being of the greatest 
3 See C. Kulesza, Conventional model of a fair appeal proceedings in the comparative per-
spective, [in:] Fairness of the New Model of Polish Criminal Appeal Proceedings in the Context of 
Delivered Research, ed. C. Kulesza, Białystok 2019, pp. 24–25; M. Fingas, Orzekanie reformatoryjne 
w instancji odwoławczej w polskim procesie karnym, Warszawa 2016, pp. 27–29.
4 In the doctrine, citing R. Kmiecik (Trójinstancyjny system apelacyjno-kasacyjny czy dwuin-
stancyjna hybryda rewizyjno-kasacyjna?, [in:] Kierunki i stan reformy prawa karnego, eds. T. Bo-
jarski, E. Skrętowicz, Lublin 1995, p. 66 ff.), it has been adopted that this model is referred to as 
a “revisory-cassatory hybrid”. Cf., among others, S. Zabłocki, Priorytety Komisji w zakresie analizy 
rozwiązań dotyczących postępowania odwoławczego oraz postępowania w trybie nadzwyczajnych 
środków zaskarżenia, “Biuletyn Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Prawa Karnego” 2010, no. 2, p. 11. Other 
authors refer to it with the term “revisory-cassatory”. See M. Klejnowska, Model postępowania 
odwoławczego i nadzwyczajnoskargowego w sprawach karnych, “Biuletyn Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej 
Prawa Karnego” 2010, no. 2, p. 34.





importance. First, the provision of Article 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure5 in 
the then wording allowed the examination of evidence in appeal proceedings only in 
exceptional cases, which significantly hindered factfinding at this stage of the trial. 
It distinguished this means of recourse from the classic appeal, which provides for 
a full substantive review of the judgement and allows re-examination of evidence at 
the appeal instance.6 Second, extensive ne peius prohibitions impeded reformatory 
adjudication. The provision of Article 454 § 1 CCP forbade the appellate court to 
convict a defendant against whom an acquittal was issued in the first instance, the 
proceedings were discontinued, or the proceedings were conditionally discontinued. 
Much greater restrictions resulted from Article 454 § 2 CCP, according to which an 
amendment of the judgement by an appellate court consisting in imposing a more 
severe penalty of imprisonment could only take place if the court did not change 
the factual findings adopted as the basis for the judgement under appeal. The third 
prohibition of ne peius indeed evolved significantly. Initially, it stated that imposing 
a harsher penalty, i.e., 25 years imprisonment penalty, was inadmissible in appeal 
proceedings. Subsequently, as a result of the 2003 amendment,7 it was moderated 
in such a way that it ruled out aggravation of the penalty at this stage of the pro-
ceedings by imposing only the sentence of life imprisonment.
Undoubtedly, the outlined model of appeal proceedings contributed to the exces-
sive length of criminal proceedings, which was identified as a “systemic problem” 
of the Polish judiciary by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Already 
in 2002, in the landmark judgement in the case of Kudła v. Poland,8 the Court 
found that introducing an effective means of complaint about excessive length of 
proceedings into the domestic legal system is a necessary response to the wave of 
repeated individual complaints about the length of court proceedings in Poland, 
but also in other countries of the Council of Europe. The problem of excessive 
length of court proceedings in Poland was explicitly recognized as “systemic” 
in the pilot judgement issued in the case of Rutkowski and Others v. Poland.9 As 
this judgement and subsequent case law show, the problem was not resolved by 
introducing the institution of the complaint about excessively long proceedings 
5 Act of 6 June 1997 – Code of Criminal Procedure (consolidated text, Journal of Laws 2020, 
item 30), hereinafter: CCP.
6 Hence, the name of this means of challenge adopted in the Code (“appeal”) did not reflect its 
true nature.
7 Act of 10 January 2003 amending the Act – Code of Criminal Procedure, the Act – Provi-
sions introducing the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Act on the crown witness and the Act on the 
protection of classified information (Journal of Laws 2003, no. 17, item 155).
8 Judgement of the ECtHR of 26 October 2000, Kudła v. Poland, application no. 30210/96.
9 Judgement of the ECtHR [pilot judgement] of 7 July 2015, Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, 
application no. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, §§ 203–206.
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in 2004, which implemented the judgement in the case Kudla v. Poland10 into the 
Polish legal system.
In judgements concerning Poland, the ECtHR several times pointed to the fact 
that the repeated quashing of the judgements of the first instance courts reveals the 
dysfunction of the judiciary and causes excessive length of the proceedings. Ad-
mittedly, the Court made a reservation that it was not its task to assess the domestic 
model of proceedings or the legitimacy of individual procedural decisions, but at the 
same time stated: “since the remittal of cases for re-examination is usually ordered 
as a result of errors committed by lower authorities, the repetition of such orders 
within one set of proceedings discloses a serious deficiency in the operation of the 
legal system”.11 The ECtHR also emphasized that “this deficiency is imputable to 
the authorities and not the applicants”.12
The ease with which judgements could be revoked and the significantly limited 
possibilities for reformatory adjudication led to absolutely bizarre situations, where 
the first-instance court tried the case several times, and its consecutive judgements 
were revoked by the appellate court due to errors which, without detriment to the 
right to two-instance proceedings, could have been remedied by the appellate court 
itself.13 The cassation-revisory model of appeal proceedings also contributed to the 
lengthiness of pre-trial detention under Article 5 (3) ECHR. The application of this 
preventive measure during the appeal proceedings is already treated as “detention after 
10 The so-called complaint against excessive length of proceedings (Act of 17 June 2004 on a com-
plaint on the violation of the party’s right to have a case examined in the pre-trial proceedings conducted or 
supervised by a public prosecutor and in the judicial proceedings without undue delay, consolidated text, 
Journal of Laws 2018, item 75, as amended) was modeled on an Italian act of law, known as the Pinto Act, 
introducing a general compensatory measure (cf., judgement of the ECtHR of 29 March 2006, Scordino 
v. Italy (no. 1), application no. 36813/97, § 63). On the evolution of this remedy, see M. Wąsek-Wiaderek, 
Sprawa Kudła v. Poland z 2000 r.: prawo do skutecznego środka odwoławczego (art. 13 of the Convention), 
[in:] Polska przed Europejskim Trybunałem Praw Człowieka. Sprawy wiodące: sprawa Kudła przeciwko 
Polsce z 2000 r., ed. E. Morawska, Warszawa 2019, pp. 168–174. On various national measures to redress 
excessive length of proceedings, see F. Edel, The Length of Civil and Criminal Proceedings in the Case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Strasbourg 2007, pp. 74–78.
11 Judgement of the ECtHR of 4 March 2008, Żelazko v. Poland, application no. 9382/05, § 58; 
judgement of the ECtHR of 3 May 2011, Chernyshov v. Poland, application no. 35630/02, § 55. With 
reference to civil proceedings, see judgement of the ECtHR of 7 July 2015, Rutkowski and Others 
v. Poland, application no. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, § 49. See also judgements concerning other 
states: judgement of the ECtHR of 27 July 2006, Mamič v. Slovenia (no. 2), application no. 75778/01, 
§ 35; judgement of the ECtHR of 19 November 2009, Telegina v. Ukraine, application no. 2035/03, 
§ 33; ECtHR judgement of the ECtHR of 16 September 2010, Beloga v. Ukraine, application no. 620/05, 
§ 28; judgement of the ECtHR of 21 July 2012, Sizov v. Russia (No. 2), application no. 58104/08, § 63.
12 Judgement of the ECtHR of 26 March 2020, Zborowski v. Poland, application no. 72950/13, § 28.
13 On the lack of constitutional obstacles to reformatory adjudication by appellate courts, see 
P. Wiliński, Konstytucyjne uwarunkowania postępowania odwoławczego w procesie karnym, [in:] 
Postępowanie odwoławcze w procesie karnym – u progu nowych wyzwań, ed. S. Steinborn, Warszawa 
2016, pp. 102–113.





conviction” under Article 5 (1) (a) ECHR. On the other hand, pre-trial detention ap-
plied after the revocation of a non-final conviction in the course of the re-examination 
of the case by the first-instance court again falls within the requirements of Article 5 
(3) ECHR. Thus, in several Polish cases, it was the repeated revocation of judgements 
by the appellate courts and the continued use of detention during the re-examination 
that actually contributed to establishing the violation of Article 5 (3) ECHR.14
The dysfunctionality of the then model of appellate proceedings was also point-
ed out by the study of the causes underlying the excessive length of the trial in 
criminal cases.15
CHANGES TO THE MODEL OF APPEAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL AGAINST A JUDGEMENT ARISING FROM 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS BINDING ON POLAND
In view of the phenomenon of protracted examination of criminal cases, one 
of the objectives of the comprehensive reform of criminal proceedings enacted in 
2013, which came into force on 1 July 2015,16 was to change the model of appeal 
proceedings. The essence of the changes consisted in the introduction of a closed 
catalogue of cases in which the appellate court may revoke the judgement of the 
first-instance court and refer the case back to the court of first instance for re-ex-
amination (new wording of Article 437 § 2 CCP).17 This change was accompanied 
by a significant reduction in the scope of ne peius prohibitions and the extension of 
the possibility of conducting an evidence examination at an appeal hearing. In the 
intention of the legislator, the judgement may be revoked only in three situations: 
14 See, in particular, judgement of the ECtHR of 29 July 2008, Choumakov v. Poland, appli-
cation no. 33868/05 and the second ECtHR judgement issued with reference to the same criminal 
proceedings: judgement of the ECtHR of 1 February 2011, Choumakov v. Poland (no. 2), application 
no. 55777/08 – in this case the first instance judgement was twice quashed by the appellate court. 
Only third reconsideration of the case by the first instance court brought it to the end. The applicant 
was detained through the whole period of criminal proceedings. See also judgement of the ECtHR 
of 20 December 2011, Zambrzycki v. Poland, application no. 10949/10, §§ 13–23.
15 See, P. Hofmański, D. Szumiło-Kulczycka, S. Waltoś, Przewlekłość procesu karnego w Polsce 
i środki jej zwalczania, [in:] Zagubiona szybkość procesu karnego. Jak ją przywrócić?, eds. S. Waltoś, 
J. Czapska, Warszawa 2005, p. 79.
16 Act of 27 September 2013 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2013, 
item 1247).
17 See M. Błoński, Uchylenie orzeczenia i przekazanie sprawy do ponownego rozpoznania jako 
wyjątkowy rodzaj rozstrzygnięcia sądu odwoławczego, [in:] Artes serviunt vitae sapientia imperat. 
Proces karny sensu largo. Rzeczywistość i wyzwania. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Tomasza Grze-
gorczyka z okazji 70. urodzin, eds. R. Olszewski, D. Świecki, J. Kasiński, P. Misztal, K. Rydz-Sybilak, 
A. Małolepszy, Warszawa–Łódź 2019, pp. 434–435.
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in the event of an absolute ground of appeal specified in Article 439 § 1 CCP, in 
the event of the fulfilment of the ne peius prohibition under Article 454 CCP and 
in the event when the entire judicial trial must be conducted anew.
From the point of view of international standards of human rights protection, the 
most important modification is the scope of the ne peius rule. Initially, the legislator 
limited the ne peius prohibitions to two, repealing Article 454 § 2 CCP. As a result, 
under the provisions being in force from 1 July 2015 to 4 October 2019, an appellate 
court could not convict a defendant who had been acquitted by a lower court or as 
to whom proceedings had been discontinued or conditionally discontinued. More-
over, it was unacceptable to aggravate the penalty at the appeal instance by imposing 
a sentence of life imprisonment. Both prohibitions underwent further restriction as 
a result of the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which entered into 
force on 5 October 2019.18 Since that date, an appeal court has been allowed to convict 
a defendant against whom the court of first instance conditionally discontinued the 
proceedings.19 Moreover, in view of repealing of Article 454 § 3 CCP, the penalty 
may be aggravated by imposing a penalty of life imprisonment at an appeal instance.
Summarising, under the current wording of Article 454 § 1 CCP, the appeal 
court may convict a defendant for the first time, if the proceedings against him 
were conditionally discontinued by the first instance court. In order to capture the 
real meaning of the recent change of this provision, on ought to conclude, that 
Article 454 § 1 CCP always (i.e., also prior to the amendments of 2015 and 2019) 
actually allowed for conditional discontinuance of proceedings by the appeal court 
in the situation when in the first instance a verdict of acquittal was passed.20 How-
ever, before the amendments of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2015, this legal 
opportunity has very limited (if any) practical impact since, as a rule, appellate 
courts were not allowed to conduct evidence proceedings and the new fact finding 
could take place at the appellate stage of the proceedings only exceptionally.
Such truncation of the ne peius prohibition translates directly into the scope of 
permissible attribution of criminal liability to the accused for the first time in the 
appellate instance in the two-instance model of criminal proceedings, in which the 
decision of the appellate court is only subject to extraordinary cassation appeal, the 
grounds for which are quite narrow and limited only to egregious infringements of 
law. Additionally, and importantly, the legislator explicitly states that a cassation 
appeal lodged by a party to proceedings cannot be brought solely on the grounds 
of the disproportionality of the penalty.
18 Act of 19 July 2019 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2019, item 1694).
19 In accordance with Article 66 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code, the proceedings may be con-
ditionally discontinued if the guilt and social consequences of the act are not significant.
20 See, in particular, judgement of the Supreme Court of 29 January 2020, II KS 27/19, LEX 
no. 2775312; judgement of the Supreme Court of 18 July 2019, IV KS 25/19, LEX no. 2714724.





In the European system of human rights protection, the right of appeal against 
a judgement is understood relatively narrowly. It is not derived from the general right 
to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.21 The case law of the ECtHR is shaping 
the standards of fair appellate proceedings in criminal cases, including those relating 
to access to the appellate or cassation stage of proceedings. However, the ECtHR 
emphasizes that no obligation to guarantee an appellate review of the judgement stems 
from this provision. However, if the national legislation provides so, it should respect 
the basic requirements of fairness. Within the context of the ne peius rules, it must 
be emphasized that the standard of fair appellate proceedings includes the personal 
hearing of the accused and the direct examination of evidence by the appellate court if 
that court alters the acquittal of the court of the first instance and passes a judgement 
of conviction in appeal proceedings. Such a procedure is necessary if that court “had 
not simply given a different legal interpretation or another application of the law to 
facts already established at first instance, but had carried out a fresh evaluation of 
facts beyond purely legal considerations”.22 However, if the issues under considera-
tion by the appellate court “have a predominantly legal character and the court does 
not carry out a fresh evaluation of the evidence but rather makes a different legal 
interpretation from that of the lower court”, then the hearing of the accused, as well 
as direct hearing of witnesses is not necessary in appeal proceedings.23 Within the 
context of these requirements, one must consider the current wording of Article 451 
CCP to be compliant with the standard stipulating that the accused be heard by the 
appellate court. The accused has the right to participate in the appeal hearing and, if 
incarcerated, he/she may request to be brought to that hearing. Any desistance from 
such appearance (if requested by the accused within the prescribed time limit) must 
result in ensuring the participation of the defence counsel in the hearing and may 
take place only in situations indicated in the case law of the ECtHR, which has been 
fully reflected in the Supreme Court’s rulings.24
The right of appeal against a criminal conviction is guaranteed by Article 2 of 
Protocol no. 7 to ECHR.25 It follows from the second paragraph of this provision 
that a conviction judgement may be passed on the basis of an appeal against an 
21 E. Cape, Z. Namoradze, R. Smith, T. Spronken, Effective Criminal Defence in Europe, Ant-
werp–Oxford–Portland 2010, pp. 52–53.
22 Judgement of the ECtHR of 10 March 2009, Igual Coll v. Spain, application no. 37496/04, § 36.
23 Judgement of the ECtHR of 16 July 2019, Júlíus Þór Sigurþórsson v. Iceland, application 
no. 38797/17, § 37. See also judgement of the ECtHR of 1 December 2020, Lamatic v. Romania, 
application no. 55859/15, § 42.
24 See judgements of the Supreme Court of Poland referring to the case-law of the ECtHR on this 
issue: judgement of the Supreme Court of 2 March 2009, IV KK 334/08, LEX no. 495314; judgement 
of the Supreme Court of 31 August 2005, V KK 58/05, OSNKW 2005, no. 11, item 113.
25 Protocol no. 7 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, adopted on 22 November 1984 (Journal of Laws 2003, no. 42, item 364).
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acquittal by a first-instance court, and that such a conviction need not be subject to 
further appeal. It is indeed emphasized that this provision guarantees the right to 
a single appeal.26 The cited provision introduces an exception to the general right 
of each person convicted of a criminal offence to have their case heard by a higher 
court, regarding both the verdict on guilt and the penalty, expressed in Article 2 (1) 
of Protocol no. 7. A different interpretation of the right of appeal against a judge-
ment has no support in the relatively modest judicial decisions of the ECtHR.27
A more definite standard in this respect is expressed in Article14 (5) ICCPR. It pro-
vides for the right of each person convicted of a criminal offence to appeal to a higher 
court for a reconsideration of the judgement of guilt and penalty in accordance with the 
law. This provision does not specify the legal form of the means of challenge, since, 
as can be seen from the history of the preparation of its final content, the intention 
was to guarantee “a more general right of review”.28 Contrary to Article 2 of Protocol 
no. 7, in Article 14 ICCPR no exception to this right is provided for.29 Although the 
understanding of the right of appeal in Article 14 (5) ICCPR gives the States parties 
to the Covenant quite considerable flexibility in regulating the manner in which the 
right of appeal is guaranteed, they are nonetheless obliged to ensure the possibility of 
a substantive review of the judgement of guilt and sentence, as well as real access to 
a means of challenge.30 This leads to the conclusion that a decision assigning criminal 
responsibility in the form of finding the accused guilty and imposing a sentence for the 
first time in appeal proceedings should be subject to appeal. Moreover, it should be 
examined by a higher court, and both the attribution of guilt and the imposed sentence 
should be reconsidered.31 This is precisely the interpretation given to this provision 
26 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, with the assistance of S.J. Summers, 
Oxford 2006, p. 371. See also P. Hofmański, [in:] Protokół nr 7 do Konwencji o Ochronie Praw 
Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Komentarz, ed. L. Garlicki, Legalis 2011, commentary on 
Article 2 of the Protocol.
27 See decision of the European Commission on Human Rights of 17 January 1994, Botten 
v. Norway, application no. 16206/90. See also K. Flinterman, Right to Appeal in Criminal Matters, 
[in:] Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, eds. P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, 
A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak, Cambridge–Antwerp–Portland 2017, p. 975; D. Djukić, The Right to Appeal 
in International Criminal Law: Human Rights Benchmarks, Practice and Appraisal, Leiden–Boston 
2019, pp. 67–68.
28 S. Trechsel, op. cit., p. 361.
29 See W. Jasiński, Redukcja postępowania przed sądem pierwszej instancji a konstytucyjny 
i konwencyjny standard prawa do odwołania się w sprawach karnych, [in:] Postępowanie odwoławcze 
w procesie karnym…, p. 120.
30 P.D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, “Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law” 2011, vol. 22(1), p. 18; A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias, K. Sękowska-Kozłowska, 
Komentarz do art. 14 Międzynarodowego paktu praw obywatelskich i politycznych, ed. R. Wierusze-
wski, LEX/el. 2012, thesis no. 18.10.
31 See HRC views adopted on 22 July 2005, Communication no. 1095/2002, Bernardino Gomaríz 
Valera v. Spain, U.N. Doc. A/60/40, vol. II, at 134 (HRC 2005), § 7. See also M. Wasek-Wiaderek, 





by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in general comments to Article 14 ICCPR. 
It explicitly states that “Article 14 (5) is violated not only if the decision by the court 
of first instance is final, but also where a conviction imposed by an appeal court or 
a court of final instance, following acquittal by a lower court, according to domestic 
law, cannot be reviewed by a higher court”.32 Additionally, the HRC further states there 
that the right to appeal “imposes on the State party a duty to review substantively, 
both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law, the conviction and 
sentence, such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the nature of the 
case. A review that is limited to the formal or legal aspects of the conviction without 
any consideration whatsoever of the facts is not sufficient under the Covenant”.33
From the Polish perspective, the key question is whether a cassation appeal 
brought by a party to the proceedings may be considered an “appeal” under Arti-
cle 14 (5) ICCPR. Because only if this question was answered positively would 
the current wording of Article 454 § 1 CCP, which allows for passing a conviction 
at the appeal instance as a result of changing the first-instance decision on condi-
tional discontinuation of proceedings, be regarded as compliant with Article 14 (5) 
ICCPR. In the Uclés v. Spain case, while assessing the possibility of considering 
a cassation as “a review” within the meaning of this provision, the HRC stressed 
that the right to review does not include the right to a retrial or a new hearing. 
“However, the court conducting the review must be able to examine the facts of 
the case, including the incriminating evidence”. Given the fact that, according to 
the case law of the Supreme Court of Spain, when examining a cassation it could 
not reassess the evidence evaluated by the trial court, the HRC concluded that “the 
review conducted by the Supreme Court was limited to a verification of whether the 
evidence, as assessed by the first instance judge, was lawful, without assessing the 
sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the facts that would justify the conviction 
and sentence imposed. It did not, therefore, constitute a review of the conviction as 
required by Article 14 (5), of the Covenant”.34 The scope of review required under 
this provision was confirmed by the HRC in other individual cases.35
Wybrane aspekty postępowania odwoławczego w procesie karnym po 1 lipca 2015 r. w świetle stan-
dardów międzynarodowych, [in:] Postępowanie odwoławcze w procesie karnym…, p. 156.
32 HRC, General Comment no. 32, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, part VII.
33 Ibidem.
34 HRC views adopted on 22 July 2009, Communication no. 1364/2005, CCPR/C/96/D/1364/2005, 
§ 11.3. The views of the HRC adopted in this case and other Spanish cases had impact on interpre-
tation of the scope of its jurisdiction in cassation proceeding by the Spanish Supreme Court. See 
P.D. Marshall, op. cit., p. 20. The Spanish model of appeal proceedings was subsequently amended 
in 2015, i.a., under the influence of the case-law of the ECtHR concerning appeal proceedings. See 
Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in States Parties: Selected Examples, Council 
of Europe, November 2016, pp. 69–70.
35 See HRC views adopted on 28 March 2006, Communication no. 1100/2002, Bandajevsky 
v. Belarus, CCPR/C/86/1100/2002, § 10.13; HRC views adopted on 6 April 1998, Communications 
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Referring these standards to the current model of the criminal procedure in 
Poland, specifically to the new wording of Article 454 § 1 CCP, leads to the con-
clusion that to a certain narrow extent it remains in conflict with Poland’s obliga-
tions under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For the sake 
of clearing the foreground, it should be noted that the change of judgement from 
conditional discontinuation to conviction at the appellate instance does not pertain 
to the issue of ascribing guilt. Since the application of this probatory measure may 
only take place when the degree of the accused person’s guilt is not significant 
(Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code), this guilt must already be established in 
the first instance judgement conditionally discontinuing the proceedings. On the 
other hand, there is no doubt that the change of the judgement from conditional-
ly discontinuing the proceedings to conviction is connected with imposition of 
a sentence for the first time at the appeal instance. The convicted person should 
therefore be entitled to appeal against this judgement, as referred to in the case law 
of the HRC under Article 14 (5) ICCPR. However, Polish law does not provide 
for such an appeal. For several reasons, one cannot consider a cassation appeal 
to be such. First, a cassation appeal in favour of a person sentenced to a penalty 
other than imprisonment without its conditional suspension may be brought in 
a very narrow scope. Pursuant to Article 523 §§ 2 and 4 CCP, its only basis may 
be the absolute ground of appeal under Article 439 § 1 CCP.36 Certainly, such 
a scope of examination by the Supreme Court of the judgement of an appellate 
court, limited to a narrow catalogue of errors listed in this provision, cannot be 
considered as the implementation of the “right to review” under Article 14 (5) 
ICCPR. This catalogue, apart from imposing a penalty or another means of penal 
reaction unknown to the Act (Article 439 § 1 (5) CCP) does not include errors 
regarding the severity of the sentence. Secondly, even if at the appeal instance 
a penalty of imprisonment is issued without conditional suspension of its execu-
tion, which denotes the possibility of lodging a cassation appeal in favour of the 
accused also with reference to a “gross violation of the law”, it is still impossible 
to question directly the severity of the sentence in this means of challenge. This 
is prevented by the contents of Article 523 § 1 in fine CCP, according to which 
a cassation appeal cannot be brought purely on the grounds of the penalty being 
disproportionate.
In conclusion, the latest amendment to Article 454 § 1 CCP, which has been 
in force since 5 October 2019, in connection with the scope of the cassation re-
no. 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995, 627/1995, Domukovsky and others v. Georgia, CCPR/C/OP/6/2005, 
§ 18.11.
36 Article 523 § 1 CCP indicates two categories of grounds for cassation appeal: absolute grounds 
of appeal indicated in Article 439 § 1 CCP (closed catalogue) and “other gross violation of the law 
if it might have a material impact on the contents of a judgement”.





view of the appellate court judgement, raises serious doubts as to its compliance 
with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.37 
Admittedly, the doctrine indicates that the term “convicted person” in Article 14 
(5) ICCPR has an autonomous meaning and covers also the person found guilty 
but not sentenced, i.e. a person subject to a judgement conditionally discontinuing 
the proceedings.38 However, even with the acceptance of such a view, which is 
not shared by the author of this article, only in case of conviction by the appeal 
court (but not in case of conditional discontinuation of proceedings) the penalty 
is imposed for the first time at the appeal instance and at least in this respect the 
accused should be entitled to a full appeal.
The issue considered here was taken into account by the legislator but justifying 
the amendment to Article 454 § 1 CCP was limited to stating that “the provision 
of Article 14 (5) ICCPR prevents only the first-time attribution of a forbidden act 
at the appeal instance”.39
As was mentioned above, since the outset of the applicability of the current 
Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., since 1998, Article 454 § 1 CCP has provided 
the appellate court with the possibility to alter the acquittal issued in the first-in-
stance proceedings into a judgement conditionally discontinuing the proceed-
ings. Until the amendment, which entered into force on 1 July 2015, in practice, 
however, there occurred no such reformatory adjudication by courts of appeal, 
but for different reasons. According to the Supreme Court ruling,40 if the court of 
first instance acquitted the accused or discontinued the proceedings, the appellate 
court may discontinue the proceedings unconditionally (in the event of prior ac-
quittal) or conditionally discontinue them only exceptionally – only if it does not 
make its own findings and when commission of an offence is obvious. In other 
cases, the appellate court should quash the judgement under appeal and refer the 
case to the court of first instance for re-examination. The change in the normative 
environment in this respect, as of 1 July 2015, by allowing the appellate court to 
conduct evidence, and above all by closing the catalogue of situations in which it 
is permissible to issue a cassatory judgement, put the courts of appeal in a com-
pletely new situation. Currently, an acquittal may only be revoked for three reasons 
specified in Article 437 § 2 in fine CCP and Article 454 § 1 CCP listed as the basis 
for such revocation does not cover situations where the appellate court deems the 
37 See decision of the Supreme Court of 7 October 2020 r., IV KS 24/20, Supremus.
38 D. Świecki, [in:] Komentarz aktualizowany do art. 454 Kodeksu postępowania karnego, LEX/el. 
2020, thesis no. 4.
39 Justification of the Draft Act no. 3251 of the Parliament of the Republic of Poland of the 
8th term, www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=3251 [access: 12.12.2020].
40 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 7 December 1994, II KRN 234/94, “Wokanda” 1995, 
no. 5, p. 13 (delivered under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, which also 
provided for similar ne peius prohibitions).
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conditional discontinuation of proceedings against a person acquitted in the first 
instance justified. Therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that if 
there are grounds for conditional discontinuation of proceedings, the appellate 
court should not revoke the judgement of the court of first instance pursuant to 
Article 454 § 1 CCP.41
As a result, on statutory grounds, it is permissible that criminal liability is 
ascribed to the accused for the first time by the appellate court, but only in the 
form of a probation measure of – conditional discontinuation of the proceedings, 
which, as already mentioned above, is associated with the imputation of guilt. 
However, this is not a conviction. Since Article 14 (5) ICCPR refers to a person 
convicted of a crime, it can be assumed that it does not include a person who was 
subject to a probation measure in the form of conditional discontinuation of the 
proceedings. Taking a different position and recognizing that the term “convicted 
person” should also be understood as the person to whom guilt was ascribed and 
whose trial was conditionally discontinued,42 would mean that also in this respect, 
i.e., in the event of altering an acquittal judgement at an appeal instance to con-
ditional discontinuation of the proceedings, the accused person’s right to appeal 
against the judgement, as guaranteed in Article 14 (5) ICCPR, would be violated.
A cassation appeal against the judgement conditionally discontinuing the pro-
ceedings may be brought by the party only because of the emergence of absolute 
grounds of appeal (Article 439 § 1 CCP). In those circumstances, it could not, by 
any means, be considered “a review” meeting the requirements of Article 14 (5) 
ICCPR. As already indicated above, due to the contents of this provision, which 
refers to the convicted person and also uses the category of “guilt and punishment”, 
it should be concluded that the possibility of changing the acquittal judgement 
issued by the first instance court into the conditional discontinuation of the pro-
ceedings by the appellate court, permitted by the Polish law, is not inconsistent 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the other hand, 
such a contradiction should be seen in the situation authorising an appellate court 
to issue a conviction, permissible since 5 October 2019, if the criminal proceedings 
were conditionally discontinued in the first instance.
41 Decision of the Supreme Court of 20 October 2020, V KS 23/20, Supremus; judgement of 
the Supreme Court of 29 January 2020, II KS 27/19, LEX no. 2775312; judgement of the Supreme 
Court of 4 July 2019, V KS 20/19, Supremus.
42 D. Świecki, [in:] Komentarz aktualizowany…





THE COMPLAINT ON THE CASSATORY JUDGEMENT OF THE 
APPELLATE COURT – A SPECIAL REMEDY AIMED AT ACCELERATION 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS?
Shortly after the new model of appeal proceedings entered into force, on 
15 April 2016, another amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure entered into 
force,43 introducing a new means of challenge into the Polish criminal procedure. In 
principle, it was intended to be an extraordinary appeal examined by the Supreme 
Court and brought against cassatory judgements issued by the appellate courts in 
breach of Article 437 § 2 CCP. As a result, since 1 July 2015, a closed catalogue 
of grounds for the revocation of the judgement has been in force, and since the 
15 April 2016, a special legal procedure for complaining against cassatory judge-
ments issued despite the lack of grounds expressed in Article 437 § 2 in fine CCP.44
Against the background of recognized European models of appellate measures 
in criminal cases, such complaint should be considered as innovative or even ex-
perimental. In addition to the complaint about the excessive length of proceedings, 
applicable to all court proceedings,45 the legislator decided to introduce the com-
plaint which neither examines the validity of the decision on guilt, nor the decision 
on penalty. Its purpose is only to examine whether the appellate court quashed 
the judgement despite the lack of statutory grounds for doing so.46 Therefore, the 
complaint does not directly contribute to eradication of the excessive length of 
proceedings. It is intended to strengthen the appellate model of criminal proceed-
ings, the side effect of which was to shorten the time needed for the examination 
of criminal cases.47
43 Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2016, 
item 437).
44 This measure may be brought against cassatory judgements issued in the course of the pro-
ceedings initiated by an indictment lodged with the court after 30 June 2015.
45 On different models of addressing the problem of excessive length of criminal proceedings 
in Europe, see F. Calvez, N. Regis, Length of court proceedings in the member states of the Council 
of Europe based on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Report CEPEJ(2018)26, 
Council of Europe 2018, p. 66. In Germany, it may take the form of stating in the operative part of 
the judgement that a specified part of the penalty imposed was to be considered as having been served 
(so-called “execution approach”, Vollstreckungslösung). See judgement of the ECtHR of 20 June 
2019, Chiarello v. Germany, application no. 497/17, §§ 29–30.
46 See D. Świecki, Nadzór judykacyjny Sądu Najwyższego sprawowany w trybie skargi na wy-
rok kasatoryjny, [in:] Ewolucja polskiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości w latach 2013–2018 w świetle 
standardów rzetelnego procesu, eds. C. Kulesza, A. Sakowicz, Białystok 2019, pp. 426–427.
47 See Justification of the draft Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Act – Code of Criminal 
Procedure and some other acts, Legislative issue no. 207 of the Parliament of the 8th term, www.sejm.
gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=207 [access: 12.12.2020].
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The introduction of the complaint into the legal system has generally been crit-
icized by the doctrine.48 It has been pointed out that there was a risk that the new 
measure would act counterproductively in the already extensive system of appeal 
measures – instead of speeding up the proceedings, it would prolong them, addi-
tionally significantly increasing the backlog of cases at the Supreme Court. Lodging 
a complaint and its examination automatically delayed sending the case files along 
with the cassatory judgement to the court of first instance for its re-examination. 
These concerns have been expressed despite the introduction of a relatively short, 
7-day deadline for lodging a complaint from the date of serving the judgement with 
the justification, as well as a complaint fee equal to the cassatory fee.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer the question of whether, without the 
institution of the complaint, the new model of appeal proceedings would become 
established enough to lead to a significant reduction in the number of cassatory 
judgements issued by appellate courts. As already indicated, only nine months after 
the change of this model, the institution of complaint was introduced into the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. As a result, the significant decrease in the total number of 
cassatory judgements observed in recent years49 cannot be attributed solely to the 
change in the model of adjudication in the appeal instance.
The conducted research of all complaints lodged with the Supreme Court from 
the beginning of the existence of this measure until the end of 2019 allows for a pre-
liminary assessment of its effectiveness and legitimacy of its introduction into the 
legal system. It ought to be concluded that the fears that the number of submitted 
complaints will paralyse the work of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court 
have not been proved. The significant extension of the time for examining a case 
by the Supreme Court is mainly due to factors other than the extension of the juris-
diction of this court with the competences for consideration of complaints. In the 
entire period covered by the study, i.e., during the years 2016–2019, 340 complaints 
48 See J. Zagrodnik, Instytucja skargi na wyrok sądu odwoławczego (rozdział 55a k.p.k.) – za-
rys problematyki, [in:] Verba volant scripta manent. Proces karny, prawo karne skarbowe i prawo 
wykroczeń po zmianach 2015–2016. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona Profesor Monice Zbrojewskiej, 
eds. T. Grzegorczyk, R. Olszewski, Warszawa 2017, pp. 520–521; S. Steinborn, Skarga na wyrok 
kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego na tle systemu środków zasakrżenia w polskim procesie karnym, 
[in:] Verba volant scripta manent…, pp. 416–417; A. Sakowicz, Zakres kontroli dokonywanej przez 
Sąd Najwyższy przy rozpoznaniu skargi na wyrok kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego, “Białostockie 
Studia Prawnicze” 2018, vol. 23(1), pp. 156–158, 171–172. Introduction of this new remedy was 
considered as “justified” by A. Lach (Skarga na wyrok sądu odwoławczego, [in:] Postępowanie karne 
po nowelizacji z dnia 11 marca 2016 r., ed. A. Lach, Warszawa 2017, pp. 259–260).
49 As transpires from the data collected from appellate courts of Lublin Appeal Region (i.e., 
Lublin Court of Appeal, and Regional Courts in: Lublin, Zamość, Siedlce and Radom), cassatory 
judgements were issued with reference to respectively: 22.95% defendants in 2013, 21.10% defen-
dants in 2014, 16.46% defendants in 2015, 11.90% defendants in 2016, 10.68% defendants in 2017, 
and 9.95% defendants in 2018.





against cassatory judgements of common courts were lodged with the Supreme 
Court,50 302 of which were examined substantively. The inflow of complaints in 
the following years was as follows: 10 complaints in 2016, 41 complaints in 2017, 
111 complaints in 2019, and 178 complaints in 2019. The detailed study did not 
cover the complaints filed in 2020, but the obtained general data show that this 
year a total of 129 complaints have been lodged with the Supreme Court. This data 
allow us to predict that the inflow of complaints, after its significant increase over 
the years 2017–2019, will stabilize at the level of approximately 150 complaints 
per year. Due to the fact that the annual inflow of a cassatory appeals in criminal 
cases to the Supreme Court amounts to about 2,000 cases (e.g., in 2020 it was 2,213 
cassation appeals), it must be stated that the introduction of the complaint did not 
significantly increase the judicial burden of the Supreme Court. The research also 
shows that complaints are brought in only about 3% of cases where it is admissible.
Over the years 2016–2019, the Supreme Court dismissed 50.33% of the lodged 
complaints, and granted 49.67%. As a result, nearly half of the complaints are ef-
fective. Such a percentage of granted complaints should be assessed as high. The 
main reason for granting the complaints was too hasty revocation of judgements by 
appellate courts with erroneous indication whereby it was necessary to repeat the 
entire judicial trial (50.67% of all granted complaints). The second main reason for 
granting the complaints was the lack of indication of the clear ground for quashing 
the first instance judgement (26.67%). This means that appellate courts continue to 
issue cassatory judgements without a proper indication of statutory grounds, which 
in turn is corrected through a complaint.
The average time of examination of the complaint by the Supreme Court is 
approximately 50 days. However, if cumulated with the time needed for examina-
tion of its formal requirements by the appellate court before sending a complaint 
to the Supreme Court, the whole complaint proceedings amount to approximately 
140–150 days. With reference to all complaints which were dismissed, this time 
extends the overall length of criminal proceedings. On the other hand, undeniably 
the complaint, if granted, may accelerate the final adjudication of the case by avoid-
ing its re-examination by the first instance court. The case is back at the appellate 
stage of the proceedings, which, however, does not prevent the appellate court 
from delivering the cassatory judgement for the second time. With reference to all 
340 examined complaints, this measure was brought for the second time within 
the framework of the same criminal proceedings only in a few cases. Indeed, all 
the above circumstances significantly impede the unambiguous assessment of the 
complaint.
However, the above data allow formulating a thesis whereby currently the 
institution of complaint, due to the very limited number of cases in which it is 
50 This number excludes complaints against the judgements of corporation and military courts.
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brought, is not a key instrument directly influencing the overall length of pro-
ceedings. This does not mean, however, that it has no “galvanising” effect on the 
courts examining appeals. For obvious reasons, however, this impact cannot be 
measured in a quantifiable way. However, one can risk a thesis whereby the very 
fact of the existing possibility of subjecting a cassatory judgement to the review of 
the Supreme Court – a judgement which previously remained beyond any judicial 
review – causes appellate courts to examine with more diligence the prerequisites 
which need to be met to revoke a judgement and refer the case to the court of first 
instance for reconsideration. It should also be noted that the complaint significantly 
contributed to the unification of the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court in terms 
of understanding the grounds for issuing cassatory judgements.
CONCLUSIONS
Due to the fact that the excessive length of criminal proceedings identified by 
the ECtHR was also generated by its structure, including the appeal proceedings 
model, a change of this model was introduced in 2015 as one of the elements of 
structural changes aimed at reducing the lengthy examination of criminal cases. In 
the following years, further legislative steps were taken to this end. One of them 
was to significantly reduce the scope of ne peius prohibitions. The current wording 
of Article 454 § 1 CCP, which allows the issuance of a first-time conviction judge-
ment by an appellate court examining an appeal against a judgement conditionally 
discontinuing criminal proceedings, raises significant doubts as to its compliance 
with Article 14 (5) ICCPR. Indeed, it cannot be accepted that an extraordinary 
measure, in the form of cassation against the judgement of the appellate court, 
fulfils the requirements of a “review” resulting from this provision. As a result, the 
latest amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 2019 and aimed 
at accelerating proceedings, weaken the procedural guarantees of the accused, in-
cluding their right to appeal against the judgement. At the same time, it cannot be 
regarded that this further reduction of the ne peius prohibition could significantly 
contribute to the acceleration of criminal proceedings. The conducted research 
shows that the most common reason for issuing unfair cassatory judgements is the 
erroneous determination that there is a need to repeat the trial in its entirety, mainly 
the complete re-examination of evidence in the case. The judgements are also often 
quashed because an appellate court sees the need to alter the judgement of acquittal 
into a conviction, and it cannot do this on its own due to the ne peius prohibition. 
On the other hand, relatively rarely, the reason for quashing a judgement (prior to 
the changes introduced in 2019) was the appellate court’s determination that there 
was a need to issue a judgement of conviction in a situation, where a judgement 
conditionally discontinuing criminal proceedings was passed in the first instance. 





This allows formulating a thesis whereby the further restriction of the scope of the 
ne peius prohibitions, made in 2019, will not translate into acceleration of criminal 
proceedings.
Although for various reasons it is difficult to unequivocally assess the introduc-
tion of a complaint against a cassatory judgement of the appellate court in 2016, 
there is no confirmation of the initial concerns whereby the complaint would slow 
down criminal proceedings, instead of accelerating them. The study conducted as 
part of the research grant leads to the conclusion that this extraordinary measure 
may contribute to reducing the number of cassatory judgements issued, which 
should translate into accelerating criminal proceedings.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that various factors influence the 
duration of examining a criminal case. Therefore, the potential outcome in the form 
of shortening proceedings as a result of model changes in the examination of appeals 
may not be finally noticeable, if there are other factors extending them, such as, e.g., 






gorczyka z okazji 70. urodzin, eds. R. Olszewski, D. Świecki, J. Kasiński, P. Misztal, K. Rydz-
-Sybilak, A. Małolepszy, Warszawa–Łódź 2019.
Calvez F., Regis N., Length of court proceedings in the member states of the Council of Europe based 
on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Report CEPEJ(2018)26, Council of 
Europe 2018.
Cape E., Namoradze Z., Smith R., Spronken T., Effective Criminal Defence in Europe, Antwerp–
Oxford–Portland 2010.
Djukić D., The Right to Appeal in International Criminal Law: Human Rights Benchmarks, Practice 
and Appraisal, Leiden–Boston 2019.
Edel F., The Length of Civil and Criminal Proceedings in the Case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, Strasbourg 2007.
Fingas M., Orzekanie reformatoryjne w instancji odwoławczej w polskim procesie karnym, Warszawa 
2016.
Flinterman K., Right to Appeal in Criminal Matters, [in:] Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, eds. P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak, Cambridge–
Antwerp–Portland 2017.
Gliszczyńska-Grabias A., Sękowska-Kozłowska K., Komentarz do art. 14 Międzynarodowego paktu 
praw obywatelskich i politycznych, ed. R. Wieruszewski, LEX/el. 2012.
Hofmański P., Szumiło-Kulczycka D., Waltoś S., Przewlekłość procesu karnego w Polsce i środki 
jej zwalczania, [in:] Zagubiona szybkość procesu karnego. Jak ją przywrócić?, eds. S. Waltoś, 
J. Czapska, Warszawa 2005.




A New Model of Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases: Acceleration v. Fairness… 205
Hofmański P., [in:] Protokół nr 7 do Konwencji o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wol-
ności. Komentarz, ed. L. Garlicki, Legalis 2011.
Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in States Parties: Selected Examples, Council 
of Europe, November 2016.
Jasiński W., Redukcja postępowania przed sądem pierwszej instancji a konstytucyjny i konwencyjny 
standard prawa do odwołania się w sprawach karnych, [in:] Postępowanie odwoławcze w pro-
cesie karnym – u progu nowych wyzwań, ed. S. Steinborn, Warszawa 2016.
Klejnowska M., Model postępowania odwoławczego i nadzwyczajnoskargowego w sprawach karnych, 
“Biuletyn Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Prawa Karnego” 2010, no. 2.
Kmiecik R., Trójinstancyjny system apelacyjno-kasacyjny czy dwuinstancyjna hybryda rewizyj-
no-kasacyjna?, [in:] Kierunki i stan reformy prawa karnego, eds. T. Bojarski, E. Skrętowicz, 
Lublin 1995.
Kulesza C., Conventional model of a fair appeal proceedings in the comparative perspective, [in:] 
Fairness of the New Model of Polish Criminal Appeal Proceedings in the Context of Delivered 
Research, ed. C. Kulesza, Białystok 2019.
Lach A., Skarga na wyrok sądu odwoławczego, [in:] Postępowanie karne po nowelizacji z dnia 
11 marca 2016 r., ed. A. Lach, Warszawa 2017.
Marshall P.D., A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, “Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law” 2011, vol. 22(1).
Sakowicz A., Zakres kontroli dokonywanej przez Sąd Najwyższy przy rozpoznaniu skargi na wyrok 
kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego, “Białostockie Studia Prawnicze” 2018, vol. 23(1), 
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.15290/bsp.2018.23.01.10.
Steinborn S., Skarga na wyrok kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego na tle systemu środków zasakrżenia 
w polskim procesie karnym, [in:] Verba volant scripta manent. Proces karny, prawo karne skar-
bowe i prawo wykroczeń po zmianach 2015–2016. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona Profesor 
Monice Zbrojewskiej, eds. T. Grzegorczyk, R. Olszewski, Warszawa 2017.
Świecki D., [in:] Komentarz aktualizowany do art. 454 Kodeksu postępowania karnego, LEX/el. 2020.
Świecki D., Nadzór judykacyjny Sądu Najwyższego sprawowany w trybie skargi na wyrok kasatoryjny, 
[in:] Ewolucja polskiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości w latach 2013–2018 w świetle standardów 
rzetelnego procesu, eds. C. Kulesza, A. Sakowicz, Białystok 2019.
Trechsel S., Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, with the assistance of S.J. Summers, Oxford 2006.
Wąsek-Wiaderek M., Sprawa Kudła v. Poland z 2000 r.: prawo do skutecznego środka odwoławcze-
go (art. 13 of the Convention), [in:] Polska przed Europejskim Trybunałem Praw Człowieka. 
Sprawy wiodące: sprawa Kudła przeciwko Polsce z 2000 r., ed. E. Morawska, Warszawa 2019.
Wąsek-Wiaderek M., Wybrane aspekty postępowania odwoławczego w procesie karnym po 1 lipca 
2015 r. w świetle standardów międzynarodowych, [in:] Postępowanie odwoławcze w procesie 
karnym – u progu nowych wyzwań, ed. S. Steinborn, Warszawa 2016.
Wiliński P., Konstytucyjne uwarunkowania postępowania odwoławczego w procesie karnym, [in:] 
Postępowanie odwoławcze w procesie karnym – u progu nowych wyzwań, ed. S. Steinborn, 
Warszawa 2016.
Zabłocki S., Priorytety Komisji w zakresie analizy rozwiązań dotyczących postępowania odwoław-
czego oraz postępowania w trybie nadzwyczajnych środków zaskarżenia, “Biuletyn Komisji 




T. Grzegorczyk, R. Olszewski, Warszawa 2017.






Justification of the Draft Act no. 3251 of the Parliament of the Republic of Poland of the 8th term, 
www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=3251 [access: 12.12.2020].
Justification of the draft Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Act – Code of Criminal Procedure and 
some other acts, Legislative issue no. 207 of the Parliament of the 8th term, www.sejm.gov.pl/
sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=207 [access: 12.12.2020].
Legal acts
Act of 6 June 1997 – Code of Criminal Procedure (consolidated text, Journal of Laws 2020, item 30).
Act of 10 January 2003 amending the Act – Code of Criminal Procedure, the Act – Provisions 
introducing the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Act on the crown witness and the Act on the 
protection of classified information (Journal of Laws 2003, no. 17, item 155).
Act of 17 June 2004 on a complaint on the violation of the party’s right to have a case examined in 
the pre-trial proceedings conducted or supervised by a public prosecutor and in the judicial pro-
ceedings without undue delay (consolidated text, Journal of Laws 2018, item 75, as amended).
Act of 27 September 2013 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2013, item 
1247).
Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2016, item 437).
Act of 19 July 2019 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (Journal of Laws 2019, item 1694).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 
4 November 1950 (Journal of Laws 1933, no. 61, item 284, as amended).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by United Nations General Assembly 
on 16 December 1966 (Journal of Laws 1977, no. 38, item 167).
Protocol no. 7 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
adopted on 22 November 1984 (Journal of Laws 2003, no. 42, item 364).
Case law
Decision of the European Commission on Human Rights of 17 January 1994, Botten v. Norway, 
application no. 16206/90.
Decision of the Supreme Court of 7 October 2020 r., IV KS 24/20, Supremus.
Decision of the Supreme Court of 20 October 2020, V KS 23/20, Supremus.
HRC, General Comment no. 32, 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, part VII.
HRC views adopted on 6 April 1998, Communications no. 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995, 627/1995, 
Domukovsky and others v. Georgia, CCPR/C/OP/6/2005.
HRC views adopted on 22 July 2005, Communication no. 1095/2002, Bernardino Gomaríz Valera 
v. Spain, U.N. Doc. A/60/40, vol. II, at 134 (HRC 2005).
HRC views adopted on 28 March 2006, Communication no. 1100/2002, Bandajevsky v. Belarus, 
CCPR/C/86/1100/2002.
HRC views adopted on 22 July 2009, Communication no. 1364/2005, CCPR/C/96/D/1364/2005.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 26 October 2000, Kudła v. Poland, application no. 30210/96.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 29 March 2006, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1), application no. 36813/97.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 27 July 2006, Mamič v. Slovenia (no. 2), application no. 75778/01.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 4 March 2008, Żelazko v. Poland, application no. 9382/05.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 29 July 2008, Choumakov v. Poland, application no. 33868/05.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 10 March 2009, Igual Coll v. Spain, application no. 37496/04.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 19 November 2009, Telegina v. Ukraine, application no. 2035/03.




A New Model of Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases: Acceleration v. Fairness… 207
Judgement of the ECtHR of 16 September 2010, Beloga v. Ukraine, application no. 620/05.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 1 February 2011, Choumakov v. Poland (no. 2), application no. 55777/08.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 3 May 2011, Chernyshov v. Poland, application no. 35630/02.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 20 December 2011, Zambrzycki v. Poland, application no. 10949/10.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 21 July 2012, Sizov v. Russia (No. 2), application no. 58104/08.
Judgement of the ECtHR [pilot judgement] of 7 July 2015, Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, appli-
cation no. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 20 June 2019, Chiarello v. Germany, application no. 497/17.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 16 July 2019, Júlíus Þór Sigurþórsson v. Iceland, application no. 38797/17.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 26 March 2020, Zborowski v. Poland, application no. 72950/13.
Judgement of the ECtHR of 1 December 2020, Lamatic v. Romania, application no. 55859/15.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 7 December 1994, II KRN 234/94, “Wokanda” 1995, no. 5.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 31 August 2005, V KK 58/05, OSNKW 2005, no. 11, item 113.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 2 March 2009, IV KK 334/08, LEX no. 495314.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 4 July 2019, V KS 20/19, Supremus.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 18 July 2019, IV KS 25/19, LEX no. 2714724.
Judgement of the Supreme Court of 29 January 2020, II KS 27/19, LEX no. 2775312.
ABSTRAKT
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przedstawienie i ocena głównych zmian modelu postępowa-
nia odwoławczego wprowadzonych w ciągu ostatnich kilku lat do polskiego procesu karnego w celu 
jego przyspieszenia i uczynienia w ten sposób zadość wymogom art. 6 ust. 1 Europejskiej Konwencji 
o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. W artykule przedstawiono argumenty na rzecz 
tezy, że zmiany te osłabiły prawo oskarżonego do odwołania się od wyroku. W rezultacie w świetle 
obecnie obowiązujących przepisów dopuszczalne jest wymierzenie kary po raz pierwszy przez sąd 
odwoławczy i rozstrzygnięcie to nie może być poddane efektywnej kontroli odwoławczej. Takie 
rozwiązanie może budzić wątpliwości co do jego zgodności z art. 14 ust. 5 Międzynarodowego Paktu 
Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych. W opracowaniu sformułowano też tezę, że nowo wprowadzo-
ny środek zaskarżenia – skarga na wyrok kasatoryjny sądu odwoławczego – wbrew początkowym 
obawom nie spowodował w praktyce „rozsadzenia” systemu środków zaskarżenia w polskim pro-
cesie karnym. Jednocześnie, pomimo stosunkowo niewielkiego zakresu jego wykorzystania, może 
przyczynić się on do wzmocnienia apelacyjnego – w przeciwieństwie do kasacyjnego – modelu 
postępowania odwoławczego i tym samym do przyspieszenia postępowania karnego. Teza ta znajduje 
oparcie w badaniach wszystkich skarg wniesionych do Sądu Najwyższego w latach 2016–2019.
Słowa kluczowe: system środków zaskarżenia w polskim w procesie karnym; Europejska Kon-
wencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności; skarga na wyrok kasatoryjny sądu 
odwoławczego; Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych
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